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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Shyamala Rajender, a postdoctoral fellow at the
University of Minnesota, filed a class action against the state college
for sexual discrimination.1 Her efforts culminated in a settlement that
enjoined the University from discriminating against women on the
basis of sex.2 Three decades later, nine members of Abercrombie &
Fitch’s salesforce sued the company, alleging employment
discrimination on the basis of minority status and gender; the parties
settled for a sum around $40 million.3 And in 2013, a class
spearheaded by George McReynolds settled with Bank of America
 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A./B.S./M.S., University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. The
author would like to thank his friends and family for constantly supporting his
academic and professional endeavors, as well as his SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Honors Seminar professor, teaching assistants, and peers for their editorial input.
1
Rajender v. University of Minnesota, 561 F. Supp. 401 (D. Minn. 1983).
2
Id.
3
Press Release, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Case: Abercrombie & Fitch
Employment Discrimination (June 17, 2003), http://www.naacpldf.org/caseissue/abercrombie-fitch-employment-discrimination.
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after accusing the financial colossus of denying black employees equal
pay and promotional opportunities in favor of white peers.4
Each of the above-noted plaintiffs used the class action
procedure to leverage their resources against opponents with plentiful
litigation war chests.5 After all, plaintiffs’ capacity to pool resources—
and prosecute a claim with the prospect of a fee shift under the
common fund doctrine—acts as one justification for upholding the
class mechanism’s effect on litigation. Class actions reduce the
frequency of imbalanced, David-versus-Goliath lawsuits, where an
individual sues a corporation and risks the litigation divesting her of
time and money at the hands of a wealthier, immortal opponent.6
Historically, the United States provided an accommodative
environment for class filings.7 Yet, since the mid-2000s, the country’s
jurisprudence warped from this supportive position, and has permitted
individual arbitration provisions to whittle away at claimants’ access
to group litigation.8 This gradual erosion of plaintiff classes’ rights
culminated in the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision American
Express Co. v. Italian Color Restaurant; there, a divided Court held
that a federal statute’s mandate requiring enforcement of arbitration
4

Alanna Petroff, Bank of America Fined $2 Million for Race Discrimination,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/24/news/companies/bofa-racial-discrimination/.
5
The McReynolds case, for example, featured over 1,000 plaintiffs in the
purported class. Karen Weise, Judge Approves Merrill Lynch's $160 Million Racial
Bias Settlement, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-06/judge-approves-merrilllynchs-160-million-racial-bias-settlement. The lawsuit brought by Ms. Rajender
featured a class of all women at the University of Minnesota system that were
subject to disparate promotional and hiring practices. Rajender, 563 F. Supp. at 402.
6
See RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & HOWARD M. ERICHSON,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 7
(5th ed. 2010).
7
West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (1820).
8
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on
a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse. And here is the
nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too
darn bad.”).
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provisions had not been overridden by federal antitrust laws that had
permitted class proceedings.9 The result functionally foreclosed a
group of plaintiffs from pursuing valid but financially negligible
claims on an individual basis.
Italian Colors and its precursors have been interpreted as curbing
employees’, shareholders’, and consumers’ abilities to pursue certain
statutorily granted rights as a group.10 In virtually every case, the
Supreme Court considered these arbitration provisions’ validity,
affirmed their enforceability despite their preclusive effects on class
actions, and left the lower federal courts to administer its holdings in
other statutory contexts.11
This Note traces the Seventh Circuit’s application of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on a contract requiring individual arbitration in
Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.; the case addresses Epic Systems
Corporation’s (“Epic”) arbitration clauses in its employment
agreements—clauses which contractually blunted a plaintiffs’ class
from aggregating a cause of action under the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”).12 The Note first overviews the caselaw surrounding
class actions and arbitration provisions. In Part II, I assess the Lewis
decision for its impacts on class actions. I conclude that federal
appellate courts normatively grapple between extending Italian
Colors’ holding to statutes like the NLRA,13 and protecting plaintiffs’
access to a litigation mechanism that can provide them cogent
redress.14 These difficult choices lead to a veritable tapestry of
decisions concerning class arbitration that both uphold the practice in
some cases, and fully prevent it in lieu of individual arbitration in
others. Finally, this article calls on the Supreme Court to resolve the
circuit split caused by Lewis by upholding the Seventh Circuit’s
9

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2306.
Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L.R. 161, 175 (Mar.
10, 2015), http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/57-1/57arizlrev161.pdf (noting that
class actions are headed for demise).
11
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
12
Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
13
29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
14
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
10
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decision to abrogate the arbitration provision in the plaintiffs’ contract.
Such a holding would memorialize the class action’s nadir at the hands
of the Federal Arbitration Act, and perpetuate a spirit that preserves
collective actions’ use in asserting statutory rights.
I. OVERVIEWING CLASS ACTIONS THROUGH THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND CASE LAW
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
The point of greatest contention in class arbitration jurisprudence,
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), does not directly address class
actions in its verbiage, largely because such a proceeding did not
formally exist until the recent adoption of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.15 Yet, the Supreme Court and its subordinate brethren
have used the FAA as a justifiable fulcrum for upholding individual
arbitrations.16 Thus, an overview of the FAA might help some
conceptualize the issues surrounding class actions and arbitration.
Congress enacted the FAA in the Roaring Twenties both to
solidify alternative dispute resolution’s (“ADR”) growing presence
alongside traditional litigation, and to ward off hostile judges trying to
keep their dockets from shrinking.17 Courts have honed in on two of
the statute’s sections—§ 2 and § 4—as a means of scrutinizing class
arbitrations’ permissiveness in the ADR context.18 Section 2 states that
contractual provisions between parties that bind those parties to
arbitration for disputes arising from that contract “shall be valid,
15

See generally 9 U.S.C. (2012) FRCP Rule 23 was merged with Equitable
Rule 38 in 1938, and underwent a major revision in 1966. See generally Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23. Both actions took place after Congress passed the FAA in 1925.
16
See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2312; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351
(2011).
17
Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 163 n.6 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 n.6 (1985)) (“The House Report accompanying the
[Federal Arbitration] Act makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration
agreement ‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs’ . . . and to
overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”).
18
9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (2012).
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irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”19 By the same token,
parties who have not contractually agreed to class arbitration cannot be
bound to it; one case simplified the idea to a catchy phrase:
“arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.”20 In turn, § 4
compels a district court to relegate parties to arbitration when one
party to the contract tries to litigate an issue covered within the scope
of that contract’s arbitration clause.21 The Supreme Court interprets
these sections together to outline where it does and does not possess
the power to review arbitral decisions.
B. Summarizing a History of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Like most American law, the class action mechanism sailed its
way into Yankee courts on English winds. Ironically, just as the
English Court of Chancery witnessed steeply declining filings of
group actions in London, the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld their domestic validity in West v. Randall.22 Despite class
actions’ availability, many lawyers relegated this tool to an unused
cupboard until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codified the
modern class action in Rule 23.23 Since then, lawyers have used the
class mechanism in a panoply of contexts, from settling aggregate tort
liability in asbestos24 and Agent Orange cases,25 to compensating
shareholders in securities suits against corporations,26 to aggregating
19

Id. § 2 (2012).
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
21
9 U.S.C § 4 (A court that is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue . . . shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.”)
22
West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (1820).
23
FED R. CIV. P. 23.
24
See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
25
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d
Cir. 1987).
26
Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F3d. 674, 685 (5th Cir. 2015).
20
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employee discrimination claims against businesses.27 Class actions’
popularity, in tandem with litigation’s soaring use and cost, continued
to rise with each passing decade.28 In the 1980’s, though, traditional
litigation found itself competing with a newer, private form of dispute
resolution.
Alternative dispute resolution—both through its less formal
iteration, mediation, and more formalized procedure, arbitration—
began its prominent rise during the Reagan administration.29 Part of
this growth stemmed from the Supreme Court’s shifting outlook on
ADR; in that decade, the Court swayed from its once-held belief that
private dispute resolution did not adjudicate parties’ legal rights, and
instead called for greater use of arbitration.30 Whether that policy shift
stemmed from judges realizing that the U.S. court system suffered
from incurable backlog, or whether the Burger Court sought to
reaffirm a then-necrotizing right to contract, is less relevant when
compared to the meteoric rise in ADR’s popularity.31
Individuals appreciated that ADR offered efficiency and
economy.32 Litigants did not spend months bogged down in procedural
minutia, and arbitration served as a temporal foil to the litigiously
clogged courts, whose rulings on trivial pre-trial motions could fill a
span of months; in contrast, an entire arbitration could go from
opening arguments to a final award in a matter of days.33 If parties
wished, they could contractually curb rules of civil procedure, and

27

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1041 (2016).
Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and
Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 872
(2004).
29
Id.
30
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984).
31
Stipanowich, supra note 28at 872.
32
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (“In bilateral
arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in
order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater
efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes.”).
33
See id.
28
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limit the number of experts each side could call to testify.34 Mediation
is even less formal; unless stated otherwise in a contract, if the parties
in mediation do not resolve their disputes, a mediator’s
recommendation binds neither party.35
Many bought into this efficacious mantra. From the mid-1990’s to
the early 2000s, demand for ADR services grew four-fold.36 Like
sharks drawn to blood, the commercial world soon caught whiff of
ADR’s benefits, added arbitration provisions into many of their
contracts with suppliers, and, in time, expanded their use of these
clauses by incorporating them into employee contracts, product
packaging, and stock certificates.37
Many businesses viewed pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a
golden goose. For them, employees, consumers, and shareholders
provided financial sustenance; if a businesses’ relationship with one of
these groups dulled, both sides contractually bound themselves to
arbitration.38 Naturally, commercial entities thought that such
34

Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions:
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 73, 88 (2011).
35
Some forms of arbitration also do not feature binding decisions, though many
arbitration clauses in commercial and non-commercial settings do feature finality in
judgments. Arbitration, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices/arbitration?_afrLoo
p=3038444056361043&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=658kn0n0b_1#%40
%3F_afrWindowId%3D658kn0n0b_1%26_afrLoop%3D3038444056361043%26_af
rWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D658kn0n0b_55 (last visited Dec. 1,
2016). Mediation infrequently requires the mediator to issue a decision, much less a
binding one. Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What's the Difference?,
FINDLAW, http://adr.findlaw.com/mediation/mediation-vs-arbitration-vs-litigationwhats-the-difference.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
36
Stipanowich, supra note 28, at 872.
37
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Beware the Fine Print Part 1:
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywherestacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.
38
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013);
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2067 (2013); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444, 449 (2003).
98
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agreements called for individual arbitration, meaning that the business
only had to arbitrate against one employee, consumer, or shareholder
at a time.39 However, aggrieved plaintiffs sought to bring the benefits
of suing as a class into arbitration proceedings. They unconventionally
combined the Rule 23 with the Federal Arbitration Act, and created a
new type of proceeding: class arbitration, a class action conducted
within an arbitration proceeding’s confines.40 Suddenly, the golden
goose looked less like a judicially divined gift and more like a costly
ugly duckling.
C. Preconceived Notions: The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on
Class Arbitration Before Concepcion
After plaintiffs’ lawyers invented the class arbitration, the
commercial sector quickly litigated against its validity; the first suit to
make its way up to the Supreme Court was Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle.41 The case featured a class who sued a lender for a
failure to disclose certain information about its mortgages.42 A state
trial court both certified a class action and entered an order compelling
arbitration.43 The justices faced a question of first impression: whether
an arbitrator could interpret an arbitration clause silent on the matter of
class arbitration as forbidding the practice, or whether such
interpretations were relegated to courts.44
A plurality of justices concluded that this question constituted a
matter of “procedural arbitrability”—whose resolution rested with an
arbitrator—as opposed to one of “substantive arbitrability”—whose
resolution rested with a court.45 Thus, the arbitrator did not encroach
on the state court’s power when he decided the class arbitration could
39

See generally Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013); Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333; Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
40
Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 444.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 448–49.
43
Id. at 449.
44
Id. at 447.
45
Id. at 452–53.
99
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go forward.46 Green Tree, however, dodged the confounding issue of
whether an arbitration clause’s silence on class proceedings permit the
such actions, or whether silence forecloses on class arbitrations
altogether.
The Court let this question fester for seven years until resolving it
in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.47 Writing for a
majority, Justice Alito concluded that the FAA precluded a plaintiff’s
class from dragooning a defendant into a class arbitration when the
contract entered into by the parties was silent on the type of arbitral
proceeding.48 Alito reiterated a prior case’s central theme: arbitration
“is a matter of consent, not coercion.”49
The majority’s opinion shifted the Green Tree inquiry in a slight
but profound way. Whereas Green Tree asked whether the arbitrator
had erred in holding the parties intended to foreclose the class
mechanism in arbitration, Stole-Nielsen required arbitrators to inquire
whether parties had agreed to arbitration. Thus, the Court moved the
negotiating burden onto plaintiffs, who would now have to bargain for
class arbitration rights in a pre-dispute contract with commercial
entities.50

46

Id. at 455.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010).
48
Id. at 687.
49
Id. at 681 (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
50
This suggestion expects plaintiffs to, above all, understand that they have the
class arbitration mechanism even available to them before they sign a contract, a fact
which very few consumers know about. Moreover, because many of these contracts
are contracts of adhesion, there is no possibility of negotiating favorable terms by
individuals. See Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Study
Finds that Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-thatarbitration-agreements-limit-relief-for-consumers/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
47
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D. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
One of the two most prominent class arbitration cases, AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, assessed a direct confrontation between the
FAA and state law addressing alternative dispute resolution.51 The
case’s plaintiffs sought to certify a class in a federal district court
alleging that AT&T had engaged in deceptive advertising for free cell
phones.52 In response, the communications giant filed a motion to
compel arbitration.53 Unlike Green Tree or Stolt-Nielsen—which
featured arbitration clauses silent on the issue of class arbitration—the
agreement signed by the case’s plaintiff’s featured a pre-dispute clause
requiring individual arbitration.54 The contract also contained
claimant-friendly terms.55
A California district court held that AT&T’s arbitration provision
violated the state’s unconscionability doctrine as interpreted by its
Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. Under the
“Discover Bank rule,” standard-form contracts that allowed a party to
evade liability from “negative value” claims—claims whose cost to
litigate individually exceed a claimant’s expected damages awards—
were unconscionable.56
The Supreme Court reversed in a splintered five-to-four vote.57
The majority concluded that the FAA’s § 2 preempted Discover Bank,
and that, because the plaintiffs had not explicitly contracted for class
arbitration in the proceeding-at-hand, they used state law to
manufacture a mechanism that differed from the one agreed to by the
parties.58 Justice Scalia bolstered his majority opinion with two policy
points: arbitration’s informality, and its lack of appellate review.59
51

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011).
Id. at 336–8.
53
Id. at 338.
54
Id. at 333.
55
Id. at 337.
56
Id. at 351–2.
57
Id. at 352.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 349.
52
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First, he argued that class arbitration would morph ADR into
procedurally laden proceedings, populated with an endless stream of
experts and hefty attorneys’ fees.60 Both would hamper arbitration’s
“lower costs, greater efficiency . . . [and] speed.”61 Second, Scalia
opined that courts’ allowance of class arbitrations would cause
businesses to forego arbitration provisions in their contracts
altogether.62 The apparatus’s increased costs (stemming from
accommodating a class arbitration) and narrow standards of appellate
review—which, for example, come about only in cases of fraud or a
lack of jurisdiction in matters of “substantive arbitrability”—would
result in “defendants . . . be[ing] pressured into settling questionable
claims.”63 For these reasons, the majority concluded that the plaintiffs
had to pursue their claims in individual arbitration.64
E. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
While Concepcion did not address a negative value suit brought
under a federal statute, the Court considered such an issue in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.65 The case presented a fairly
simple question: did the FAA permit “courts . . . to invalidate
arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class
arbitration of a federal-law claim”?66 A restauranteur alleged a
negative value claim against American Express (“AmEx”); despite a
class waiver and an arbitration clause in his contract, he filed an
antitrust class action against the credit card colossus.67
Round one went to AmEx when a federal district court granted the
company’s motion to compel arbitration,68 but the Second Circuit
reversed on the ground that individual arbitration’s trial costs for the
60

See id. at 348.
Id.
62
See id. at 350.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 352.
65
133 S.Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 2306.
61

102

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

plaintiffs blocked them from asserting Sherman Act claims
individually.69 To the appellate court, class arbitration was a logical
compromise that both preserved AmEx’s desire for private dispute
resolution and permitted the plaintiff’s to pursue their cause of action
without it costing them more than each claim was worth.70 Further,
AmEx’s arbitration provision was less generous when compared to
Concepcion’s; these unfavorable terms made it easier for the plaintiff
to assert that the contract he had entered into prevented him from
litigating an allegedly valid claim against AmEx.71
The Court analyzed whether the plaintiff’s argument that the
contract weakened his ability to sue under the Sherman Act overrode
the FAA’s § 2 mandate to interpret parties’ arbitration agreements by
their terms.72 The plaintiff raised an exception in the FAA that
invalidates arbitration clauses when they prevent the “effective
vindication” of statutory rights; because each class member asserted a
“negative value” claim, those members could not effectively bring
their claims without the class action mechanism.73
Justice Scalia disagreed. Delivering a knockout blow to the
plaintiffs, the conservative jurist concluded that the Sherman Act does
69

Id.
Id. at 2309.
71
AmEx’s arbitration terms were far less generous than AT&T’s in
Concepcion. Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 3367
(2011) (“In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement specifies that
AT&T must pay all costs for non-frivolous claims; that arbitration must take place in
the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or less, the
customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone, or
based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in small claims court
in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award any form of individual relief,
including injunctions and presumably punitive damages.”) with Brief for Respondent
at 17, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, (No. 12-133)
(Moreover, the plaintiffs in Concepcion . . . would be able to vindicate those claims.
Under the distinctive pro-consumer features of AT&T Mobility’s arbitration clause,
‘aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be
made whole,’ making the claims at issue ‘most unlikely to go unresolved.’”).
72
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244); Italian Colors Rest.,
133 S.Ct. at 2309.
73
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. at 2309.
70
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not “guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of
every claim,” nor does it have any intent that waives class procedures;
“the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a
statutory remedy . . . does not constitute the elimination of the right to
pursue that remedy.”74 Dissenting, Justice Kagan noted that enforcing
the individual arbitration provisions would throw up insurmountable
barriers to litigation, including expert witness costs that would
outspend expected individual damages awards by double-digit
multiples.75 She opined that “[n]o rational actor would bring a claim
worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in
the hundreds of thousands.”76 Ultimately, the Justices factionalized
along similar ideologies as they had in Concepcion, with the majority
holding the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate individual
arbitration clauses.77
F. The Circuit Split: D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. and Lewis v. Epic
Systems Corp.
The same year the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Italian Colors, the Fifth Circuit decided D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB.78
In D.R. Horton, a class of superintendents sought to initiate class
arbitration proceedings alleging that their employer had “misclassified
them as exempt from statutory overtime protections in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.”79 Horton advised the claimants that they
signed a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” that required individual
arbitration between each claimant and itself.80 In response, the
claimants filed an NLRA infraction with the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”).81 A Board administrative judge
74

Id.
Id. at 2316.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 2309–12.
78
737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
79
Id. at 349.
80
Id.
81
Id.
75
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determined that Horton had indeed violated the NLRA by restraining
the employees from engaging in a collective action guaranteed under §
7 of the Act.82 Horton appealed to the Fifth Circuit.83
The appellate court reversed the NLRB’s decision in a two-to-one
split.84 Writing for the majority, Judge Southwick reminded the Board
that, while courts ordinarily give the agency’s adjudicatory arm
judicial deference, such deference would be withheld where the Board
has interpreted the NLRA to the ignorance of other “Congressional
objectives.”85 No previous case had held class action waivers in
arbitration agreements as violative of § 7.86 Judge Southwick
understood that concerted actions brought by workers against
employers served as a means of parlaying improved employment
terms; however, he observed that preservation of the FAA’s modern
interpretation merited a more compelling interest.87
The majority opined that class action procedures are not a
substantive right guaranteed to litigants.88 While the class action may
help claimants receive some form of remedy through its procedures,
the mechanism itself does not serve as that remedy.89 The Board
claimed that the Mutual Arbitration Agreement violated § 7 of the Act,
and thus triggered the FAA’s savings clause that did not require its
enforcement.90 Yet, in mirroring the Supreme Court’s rationale in
Concepcion and arguing that the FAA required the enforcement of
arbitration agreements, the Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the
savings clause was not triggered.91 In rationalizing this conclusion,
Judge Southwick reiterated Justice Scalia’s points on class arbitration
proceedings: they are inefficient, they prevent multilayered review,
82

Id. at 355–56.
Id. at 348.
84
Id. at 364.
85
Id. at 356 (quoting Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).
86
See generally id.
87
See id. at 359–60.
88
Id. at 357.
89
See id.
90
Id. at 359.
91
Id. at 362.
83
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and they would serve as a disincentive to businesses for including
arbitration agreements in their contracts in the first place.92
Similarly, the majority failed to find a contrary congressional
command, either express or implied, in the NLRA that showed a
congressional will to circumvent the FAA and disallow arbitration
clauses.93 It then concluded that the Board’s ruling was improper, and
that Horton’s arbitration agreement with its employees must be
enforced.94
In dissent, Judge Graves agreed with the Board and that Horton’s
contract violated the plaintiffs’ abilities to pursue a statutorily-granted
and substantive right to collective action.95 Further, the jurist argued,
while the FAA was intended to prevent an ongoing judicial crusade
against private dispute resolution in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, “[t]o find that an [individual] arbitration agreement must
yield to the NLRA is to treat it no worse than any other private
contract that conflicts with Federal labor law.”96
Graves’s opinion took some time to reverberate across the
appellate courts, but eventually it struck a chord with Judge Wood
when the Seventh Circuit considered Lewis.97 There, the plaintiff
class’s employer, Epic Systems Corp. (“Epic”), emailed its employees
an arbitration agreement that mandated individual arbitration for
certain “covered claims,” such wage-and-hour disputes.98 The clause
further proscribed parties from
[b]ring[ing] a claim on behalf of other individuals, and
any arbitrator [from]: (i) combin[ing] more than one
individual's claim or claims into a single case; (ii)
participat[ing] in or facilitat[ing] notification of others of

92

Id. at 539.
Id. at 360–61.
94
Id. at 364.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 365 (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 36274, at *11 (2012)).
97
See generally Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
98
Id. at 1151
93
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potential claims; or (iii) arbitrat[ing] any form of a class,
collective or representative proceeding.99
The email stated that if the employees continued to work at Epic, they
accepted this provision; it also required an acknowledgment from each
employee at the end of the email.100 The lead plaintiff acknowledged
these emails.101 However, once a labor dispute developed between him
and Epic, he sued in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin.102 The corporation moved to compel arbitration,
and Lewis countered, alleging that the arbitration clause violated the
National Labor Relations Act by “interfer[ing] with employees’ right
to engage in concerted activities.”103 The district court denied Epic’s
motion to dismiss, and the business appealed to the Seventh Circuit.104
The NLRA provides that employees may “engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection,” and furthers the protection of this right by rendering
unenforceable any contracts that renounces employees’ rights
guaranteed by Act.105 The NLRB has consistently rebuked employers
from imposing individual agreements that curbed employees’ access to
concerted actions.106 And while the Act did not explicitly define
“concerted activities”, both the district court and the Seventh Circuit
concluded that class actions “fit well within the [term’s] ordinary
understanding.”107 Epic contended that, because FRCP Rule 23 did not
exist in 1935, the NLRA could not have protected an action that did
not exist when it was passed.108 However, an unpersuaded Judge
Wood noted, Rule 23 was not divined from tabula rasa. Indeed, West
v. Randall and its progeny proved that collective actions had existed
99

Id. at 1154–55.
Id. at 1151.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1151.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1152.
107
Id. at 1153.
108
Id. at 1154.
100
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well before Judicial Conference of the United States first drafted the
FRCP. Thus, the NLRA protected the class action purported by
Lewis.109
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court on the case’s next
issue: whether Epic’s arbitration clause violated the NLRA.110
Answering in the affirmative, the unanimous panel held that the
individual arbitration provision ran afoul of the NLRA; the clause
prevented employees from suing through a “concerted activity”, and
thus qualified as an “unfair labor practice.”111 The court distinguished
itself from the Ninth Circuit—which concluded that, where an
employer allowed an employee to “opt-out” of an individual
arbitration without penalty, that employer’s arbitral policy did not
violate the NLRA.112 While its sister court permitted such arbitration
clauses to stand, the Seventh Circuit found that an individually
bargained-for arbitration agreement limiting concerted actions in such
a way is per se invalid.113
Finally, on the issue of whether the FAA conflicts with and
supersedes the NLRA in its mandate to enforce Epic’s arbitration
clause, Judge Wood interpreted that the former did not bind the court
to enforce the provision.114 The FAA’s savings clause—which
requires courts to enforce ADR agreements “save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for [their] revocation”—permitted the
NLRA class action to continue because the NLRA itself made the
arbitration clause illegal.115

109

Id.
Id. at 1156.
111
Id. at 1155.
112
Id.
113
In her opinion, Judge Wood points out that the NLRB has followed such a
per se mantra in its hearings as well, and that the Ninth Circuit failed to cite why it
did not engage practice Chevron deference to the Board’s decisions. I suspect that
the Ninth Circuit might have been trying to be Solomonic in its decision, given that
most Supreme Court jurisprudence does not favor employees in such situation. The
Seventh Circuit’s decision, then, tilts more toward the idealistic. Id.
114
Id. at 1160.
115
Id.
110
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Wood excoriated the D.R. Horton majority for parroting Scalia’s
“class arbitration is inefficient” rationale.116 To her, the Fifth Circuit
had not even attempted to reconcile the two statutes, and instead
“pick[ed] . . . among congressional enactments.”117 She also took
Italian Color’s reasoning and spun it on its head. Whereas the
Supreme Court reasoned that antitrust laws cannot pursue their general
purpose at all costs (such as in vindicating the rights of negative value
claimants through class arbitration), Judge Wood posited that the FAA
cannot usurp all class-action-permitting statutes to protect ADR from
the judiciary’s scrutiny.118 For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit
found Epic’s arbitration agreement unenforceable, and affirmed the
Wisconsin district court.119
II. FAMILIAR BACKINGS: ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING
INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION PROVISIONS AND CLASS ARBITRATION
The positions taken by D.R. Horton and Lewis clearly
disharmonize the circuit courts. The Seventh Circuit went out on a
limb with Epic Systems, swimming against the jurisprudential current
followed by other courts of appeal.120 What used to be an uneven split
disfavoring the Seventh Circuit, though, has recently become more
even-keeled. On the one hand, the Eighth and Second Circuits agree
with the Fifth.121 Through August, the Seventh Circuit stood alone
against its three appellate brethren. However, toward the end of that
month, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Wood, and created a more
even, three-to-two fissure.122
The policy points that each side argues attract certain special
interests as well. On the one hand, academics and regulatory agencies
champion the cause of the lowly plaintiffs’ classes; this pair aims to
116

Id. at 1158.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1161.
120
See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2013);
Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013).
121
See supra note 120.
122
Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2016).
117
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level the current legal landscape surrounding class arbitration so that
individuals have a fighting chance.123 On the other side, large law
firms and special interest groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
advocate for individual arbitration provisions, claiming they reduce
wasteful litigation and promote the freedom to contract with fewer
regulatory encumbrances.124 This Note will next shift to assess some
of these positions; it first summarizes arguments against individual
arbitration mainly levied by academics and media sources, and then
dives into the private sector’s ripostes. Finally, it argues why Lewis
properly sided with academia and regulatory agencies.
A. Opinions Disfavoring Individual Arbitration
Legal academia coalesces its scholasticism on arbitration
provisions and class waivers around two similar but distinct cores.
Some argue for the idealistic, calling for a ban on individual
arbitration provisions between commercial entities and employees,
shareholders, and consumers.125 Others fight for a more pragmatic
(albeit flawed, in my opinion) position that allows for class
arbitrations.126 Many scholars overarchingly view the commercial
123

See Fitzgerald, supra note 10 at 199; Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration
Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 266 (2015).
124
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Epic Systems v. Lewis, (Nos. 16-285 & 16300), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16-285-16-300-certamicus-chamber.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Letter from David Hirschmann,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness,
and Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, to Ms.
Monica Jackson, Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Dec.
11, 2013) [hereinafter Chamber Letter],
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB__arbitration_cover_letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
125
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 652 (2012),
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/79_2/03
%20Gilles%20Friedman%20ART.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
126
See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?,
60 Kansas L. Rev. 101, 128 (2012).
110

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

19

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

sector as weaponizing arbitration provisions against individuals in a
way that exceeds their intended purpose under the FAA.127 Some
authors analyze the problems they cause in certain sectors like
employment or business law, while another group spells a far greater
threat to the general sphere of litigation; one author has gone so far to
say that arbitration provisions have the propensity to “eliminate
virtually all class actions.”128
Perhaps the strongest points scholastics make is the
inapplicability of arbitration clauses in parties with disparate
bargaining power.129 The FAA’s legislative history strongly indicates
that Congress enacted the statute to foster arbitration between
businesses, not between a business and individuals.130 Why would
Congress want to limit the FAA only between such parties? After all,
ADR provides feuding parties an efficient forum for resolving their
qualms, as the streamlined process avoids the public court system’s
sluggishness. Rather than a judge deciding an issue through a
generalist application of the law, ADR supplies an adjudicator with
specific acuity in a legal niche to precisely apply (at times) arcane
legal doctrines, and to resolve a conflict between parties.131 If the
parties would like to circumscribe certain rules of evidence or
procedure to quicken the arbitration’s pace, then they could
contractually agree to forego such formalities.132 Parties can still reap
benefits from such proceedings when they are between an individual
and a commercial entity.

127

Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 164 n. 9.
Id. at 161.
129
Id. at 164 n.9.
130
Id.
131
Łukasz Gembiś, Are We Dealing with the Trend of Specialised Arbitration?,
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (May 9, 2016),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/05/09/are-we-dealing-with-the-trend-ofspecialised-arbitration/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
132
Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, In Arbitration, a
‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-aprivatization-of-the-justice-system.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
128
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Yet, arbitrations that feature an individual going against a
business usually do not involve careful negotiation over an arbitration
clause’s terms.133 Rather, scholastics argue, the commercial actor
presents a person with a standard-form contract at some “trigger deal”
such as purchasing a product or share of stock, or obtaining
employment.134 The individual cannot tailor her contract with the
commercial actor both because she does not possess sufficient
bargaining power to convince the business to make contractual
concessions, and because the business could not feasibly keep track of
the various bargains it strikes with each individual employee or
shareholder. Thus, the individual has two options: walk away from the
“deal” and find another (presumably one that does not feature an
arbitration provision), or take the “deal” despite its unfavorable terms.
Many opt for the latter either because they do not care that the “deal”
cedes their (and the business’s) access to a court, they feel that they
will not get into a conflict with the business that would result in
litigation, or they are unwittingly unaware that the contract even has
an arbitration clause.135
Narrowing to a labor context, even if a potential employee walks
away from a contract that limits the parties to individual arbitration
and seeks a contract without such constrictions, that employee might
not find an employer that offers such terms. In this example, I assume
that the employee is searching for jobs in a particularized sector, such
as a computer manufacturer or cell phone service provider. If that
sector’s participating companies each possess employment contracts
with individual arbitration provisions, then that employee would either
be forced to work in a different market, or—if the employee cannot
133

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 176.
Id. Courts have upheld the validity of such “package” contractual
provisions, despite the fact that the consumer might not have had the opportunity to
read the language on the packaging until after she bought it.
135
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132 (“Prevented from joining
together as a group in arbitration, most plaintiffs gave up entirely, records show. . . .
Many companies give people a window—typically between 30 and 45 days—to opt
out of arbitration. Few people actually do, either because they do not realize they
have signed a clause, or do not understand its consequences, according to plaintiffs
and lawyers.”).
134
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readily transfer from one industry to another because his work
experience or education is particularized to one industry—acquiesce to
a contract requiring arbitration. In this way, certain sectors can
implicitly act as cartels in their standard-form contracts.
The choice between an individual accepting such a contract and
seeking access to a court with a less restrictive contract raises an
inherent question: how are individuals disadvantaged in arbitration
through standard-form contracts? For plaintiffs like those in
Concepcion, whose arbitration terms were rather generous, the
problem of chronically imbalanced dispute resolution does not seem as
apparent.136 Under AT&T’s arbitration clause, plaintiffs enjoy a
convenient location to arbitrate (the plaintiff’s county), AT&T pays
for the costs of arbitration, and the arbitrator is not capped at a
damages award.137
Despite the AT&T contract’s facially favorable terms, the
benefits reaped by the cellular service provider outnumber those
enjoyed by individual plaintiffs.138 By requiring individual arbitration,
AT&T can minimize its exposure to large litigation expenses and
contain a dispute’s costs to small, individualized arbitral awards as
136

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–7 (2011).
Id. at 336–37. (“In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement
specifies that AT & T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that arbitration
must take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of
$10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person,
by telephone, or based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in
small claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award any form
of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably punitive damages. The
agreement, moreover, denies AT & T any ability to seek reimbursement of its
attorney's fees, and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater
than AT & T's last written settlement offer, requires AT & T to pay a $7,500
minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees.”)
138
Id. at 365 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“But class proceedings have
countervailing advantages. In general agreements that forbid the consolidation of
claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate.
I suspect that it is true even here, for as the Court of Appeals recognized, AT & T
can avoid the $7,500 payout . . . simply by paying the claim's face value, such that
‘the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still
just $30.22.’”).
137
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opposed to a larger class award. Rather than claimants receiving a
potential benefit from litigation passively—as they would if they were
in a class and not acting as a class representative—individual
arbitration requires active litigation on behalf of all plaintiffs if those
plaintiffs want to collect any damages. The burden to litigate shifts
from a select individual or small group to many more (depending on
the scope of the harmful activity, of course). Given this, individual
arbitration clauses promote an active, “opt-in” form of dispute
resolution rather than a passive, “opt-out” model (as Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions normally are structured).139 Such a model prevents
plaintiffs from filing an action that asks for a lump-sum damages
award for all putative class members—including passive plaintiffs,
which give class action damages their “meat.”
Ultimately, an “opt-in” action dulls class actions’ capabilities of
fulfilling tort law’s behavior-deterrent purpose.140 One would expect
that fewer individuals would pursue a claim that requires active
participation rather than passive participation. Active participation
requires a claimant to expend time and money, costs that some people
might not find worthwhile paying relative to the expected damages
they might receive (or, if they lose, the possibility of facing no reward
and a hefty bill for attorneys’ fees). With less participation, a
corporation could be expected to pay out fewer damages awards to a
smaller pool of plaintiffs. In this sense, individual arbitration
provisions not only threaten the existence of the class action
procedure, but also weaken the bedrock of certain principles of tort
law.141
139

See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(c)(2)(B). Other class actions brought under
statutory schemes like the Fair Labor Standards Act provide for such an “opt-in”
structure. Sam J. Smith & Christine M. Jalbert, American Bar Association,
Certification – 216(b)Collective Actions v. Rule 23 Class Actions & Enterprise
Coverage under the FLSA 2 (Nov. 2, 2011) (unpublished paper, American Bar
Association).
140
Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3934621 at *9–14.
141
See id.
114
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Implicitly, Lewis preserves the class mechanism as a means of
dispute resolution.142 Judge Wood frequently mentioned how the
NLRA protected covered employees’ abilities to engage in “concerted
activity.”143 The Act’s legislative history reflects that collective
actions are intended to provide workers with access to proper redress;
part of this redress involves levying both ordinary and exemplary
damages on a defendant so as to chill the behavior that harmed
individuals in the first place.144 Wood noted that other circuit courts
took issue with arbitration provisions that proscribed damages
awards.145 Individual actions would not provide as great a deterrent
effect on corporations; in addition to business’s reduced exposure to
actual damages, punitive damages stemming from individual suits
would be limited to smaller amounts (assuming uniform, single-digit
multiplier caps) than such damages deriving from a class award.
Aside from chipping away at tort law’s deterrent effect,
mandatory individual arbitrations’ proscriptive procedures also
prevent plaintiffs from presenting a case against a defendant. Clauses
that limit parties in or prohibit them from introducing experts might
make an employment discrimination suit depend solely on party
testimony. Plaintiffs facing such limitations might fail in providing
sufficient evidence to make out their cause of action. The same effect
occurs in procedures that limit the amount of interrogatories parties
may send to one another, or in procedures that limit the amount of
evidence parties may present to the arbitrator.
Scholastics argue that even if an arbitration proceeds under
traditional rules of evidence and procedure, other pecuniary issues
malign plaintiffs when they individually arbitrate. For example, class
actions may serve as the only means by which a plaintiff (or a group)
could afford experts to prove their claim.146 While Lewis did not
specifically address this financial quandary, other courts have raised it
142

Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1152.
144
Id. at 1153.
145
Id. at 1160.
146
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 172–73.
143
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in a context that could readily be ascribed to employment actions.147
To illustrate, if an arbitration provision does not detail whether
attorneys’ or experts’ fees shift to a party, then the plaintiff will have
to dole out the costs of those people, all in the hopes that she can
recover an award that covers the fees she accrued during arbitration. In
alleged “negative value” suits—claims whose individual cost to
litigate exceed the expected damages award—plaintiffs cannot
feasibly litigate without harming themselves financially. On the other
hand, the commercial defendant, by virtue of being a business entity,
usually has an ample fisc to cover litigation expenses, and thus can
afford expert testimony and hefty attorneys’ fees more readily.
The class action levels the playing field from a dollars
perspective, as it provides plaintiffs the benefit of cost-sharing
amongst themselves. While cost-sharing’s virtues are apparent in
“positive value” claims, its utility is felt most when used in the
“negative value” suits. Expert witness fees are simply subtracted from
an aggregate damages award, and then the parties split that cost up
amongst themselves. In turn, one plaintiff will not be saddled with the
cost of the expert, and a class’s negative value claims become feasible
to pursue.
Additionally, both academics and the Lewis majority scoff at the
idea that class arbitration—one of individual arbitration’s
alternatives—is irreconcilable with arbitration’s intended informality.
One academic paper challenged this claim after Justice Scalia raised it
in Concepcion’s majority.148 Scalia argued that class arbitration
threatened ADR’s informality and economy by bogging down a
speedier alternative to litigation with cumbersome Rule 23 procedures
147

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“Italian Colors cannot prevail in arbitration without an economic
analysis defining the relevant markets, establishing Amex’s monopoly power,
showing anticompetitive effects, and measuring damages.”). Employment
discrimination experts, while presumably not as expensive as experts in economics
or medicine, still could charge a hefty hourly rate. See Expert Witness Fee Study,
SEAK, http://www.seak.com/expert-witness-fee-study/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
148
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions:
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y SPECIAL ISSUE 73, 89 (2011).
116
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like certification; he felt that until an individual arbitration clause
affected a parties’ substantive rights, courts would be forced to uphold
such provisions.149
In response, Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk noted that
Scalia’s failure to provide a bright-line rule as to what constituted a
substantive violation provides the judiciary with capricious latitude in
enforcing such arbitration provisions.150 While the authors did not
express a problem with such latitude, they criticized Scalia for
invalidating California’s attempts at trying to draw a more definitive
line with its Discover Bank rule.151
Lewis’s majority took this argument a step further; it criticized
the Fifth Circuit as mimicking Scalia’s uncompromising protection of
arbitration’s informality.152 The Seventh Circuit argued D.R. Horton
was “looking for trouble” when it suggested that “any law that even
incidentally burdens arbitration . . . necessarily conflicts with the
FAA.”153 Judge Wood observed that, in its quest to maintain
arbitration’s relaxed nature, the Fifth Circuit caused the FAA to trump
a federally granted substantive right—in that case, the right for
employees to act in concerted activity given to them under the
NLRA.154 Rather than one statute superseding the other, the two
statutes should be reconciled.155 In this case, the plaintiffs’ arbitration
agreement triggered the FAA’s savings clause that enforces arbitration
agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
. . . .”156 Because the NLRA affirmatively grants the right to concerted
actions, it would follow that Epic’s individual arbitration provision
was illegal under the Act, and therefore unenforceable under the
FAA’s savings clause.157 Judge Wood rebuked Scalia’s standard,
noting that the FAA “does not ‘pursue its purposes at all costs’”; even
149

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 356 (2011).
Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 148 at 89.
151
Id.
152
Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157–58 (7th Cir. 2016).
153
Id. at 1158.
154
Id. at 1157–58.
155
Id. at 1158.
156
Id. at 1159–60.
157
Id. at 1160.
150
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if Epic’s arbitration clause allowed for class proceedings, such a
concerted action would be allowed by the NLRA.158
Several media sources have reported on individual arbitration
clauses’ effects, and have reached conclusions similar to
academics’.159 In a lengthy series on arbitration, the New York Times
determined that not only do few individuals know most standard-form
contracts contain arbitration provisions, but, once they find out, even
fewer bother to pursue their claim at all.160 Moreover, the relative lack
of bargaining power employees and consumers have in negotiating
their arbitration provisions extends well beyond them; corporations
wield sufficient leverage to make even their corporate-level executives
sign arbitration provisions addressing labor disputes.161
The media also calls arbitrators’ objectivity into question.
Ostensibly, arbitrators supplied through the two major ADR service
providers, JAMS and AAA, decide cases in an impartial manner.162
However, several arbitrators have noted that they felt “beholden to
158

Id. at 1159. While Judge Wood’s point comports with her theory that the
NLRA requires concerted actions, I question whether a class arbitration would be
held valid under the NLRA, and then invalidated under the FAA and relegated to
ordinary class action litigation rather than class arbitration.
159
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 37; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff,
supra note 132; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, In Religious
Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. T IMES (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitrationscripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html; Consumer Reports, Know what you’re giving up
with arbitration clauses, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 3, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/01/03/the-consumer-rights-you-givingaway/1yD9doj2vBZdOKNCkxCmFK/story.html; With Mandatory Arbitration,
Corporate America Opts Out of the Legal System, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, (Jan.
19, 2016), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202747147639/WithMandatory-Arbitration-Corporate-America-Opts-Out-of-the-LegalSystem?slreturn=20160128215741.
160
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 135.
161
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 37 (“the use of class-action bans is
spreading far beyond low-wage industries to Silicon Valley and Wall Street, where
banks like Goldman Sachs require some executives to sign contracts containing the
clauses.”).
162
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132 (“The American Arbitration
Association and JAMS [serve as] the country’s two largest arbitration firms . . . .”).
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companies” because they often paid for the administration of
arbitration.163 In a common scenario where the individual serves as a
“one-time player” in the arbitration, and the business acts as a “repeat
player” that both hires and habitually comes before an arbitrator, that
arbitrator has a pecuniary interest to arbitrate in favor of the party that
controls the amount of business provided to her.164 Beyond this
financial bias, studies have shown that arbitrators form psychological
biases that favors arbitral “repeat players.”165
B. Positions Supporting Individual Arbitration
While academics excoriate arbitration provisions’ maladies,
large law firms and pro-business lobbies advocate for their
enforcement. Purported “BigLaw” firms’ stance supporting class
waivers and individual arbitration clauses juxtaposes well with
professors’.166 That large law firms support individual arbitration
should not come as a shock; when a plaintiffs’ class sues a
corporation, the corporation often retains a BigLaw firm to represent
it, and one should expect the literature these firms distribute to cater to
clients’ needs.
163

Id.
See id. See also Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: the Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 222 (1997).
165
Bingham, supra note 164 at 223.
166
Kirkland Alert, Kirkland & Ellis, Supreme Court Upholds Class-Action Ban
in Arbitration Agreements,
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert_050211.pdf; Memorandum
from Simpson Thatcher to Clients, May 3, 2011,
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existingcontent/publications/pub1200.pdf?sfvrsn=2; Consumer Finance Letter – July 2013,
O’Melveny Myers, Regulators Focus on Attempts to Recover Delinquent Consumer
Debt, (July 26, 2013), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-andpublications/publications/consumer-finance-newsletter-july-2013/?sc_lang=ja-JP;
Mayer Brown Newsletter, Mayer Brown, US Employment Litigation Round-Up for
June 2016,
https://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/detailprint.aspx?publication=12550 (last
visited Dec. 2, 2016).
164
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Weil, Gotshal & Manges published an article that extolled the
holdings in Concepcion, Italian Colors, and their progeny.167 The
article warned clients not to reserve the question of whether an
arbitration clause allows for class arbitration to the arbitrator; rather,
clients should try to have a court decide the issue of whether a clause
allows for class arbitration.168 These actions would preserve the
question of arbitrability for robust appellate review under a de novo
standard. Additionally, businesses that wish to avoid the threat of class
arbitration must expressly denote its unavailability directly in the
contractual provision.169
Law firms that represent commercial clients issued memos on
Concepcion and Italian Colors’ potential impacts, and offered
suggestions on how to trek the new legal landscape.170 A group of
lawyers from one firm went on to write an op-ed excoriating scholars
for lamenting class arbitration’s death without any supportive
empirics.171 They noted that arbitrators continue to allow class
arbitrations, and did not skirt the point that “negative valueclass
arbitrations often resulted in negligible or no damage awards for
plaintiffs, but did yield high plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.172
167

P. Christine Deuelle & Corey Berman, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, The Future
of Class Arbitration: Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Arbitration Clauses
Interpretation and Enforceability, CLASS ACTION MONITOR, July 23, 2013, at 1,
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Summer_2013_Class_Action_Monito
r.pdf; David Lender et al., Weil, Gotschal & Manges, U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms
Enforceability of Class Arbitration Waivers in Consumer Class Actions, CLASS
ACTION MONITOR, January 2016,
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/150816_class_action_monitor_nov2015_q4
_v5.pdf
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See Deuelle & Berman, supra note 167.
171
James H. Carter and John V.H. Pierce, Have Class Arbitrations Found New
Life?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2015,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=33a34810-c383-4135-a75cbc98bc5e8f7b.
172
Id. The article notes that in one case, for example, a plaintiffs’ class received
no actual damage awards, and only $2 million dollars in punitive damage awards,
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Turning to pro-business lobbying organizations, the United
States Chamber of Commerce (“the Chamber”) lobbies Congress to
insulate businesses from the threat of frivolous class actions.173 The
Chamber has also acts as an ardent amicus throughout the Supreme
Court’s consideration of these arbitration clauses, including cases like
Concepcion, Italian Colors, and other landmark cases.174
The Chamber observed that individual arbitration serves as a
balanced process amongst participants, and that its critics
mischaracterize its effects on individual claimants.175 “[A]rbitration
before a fair, neutral decision maker leads to outcomes for consumers
and individuals that are comparable or superior to the alternative—
litigation in court—and that are achieved faster and at lower
expense.”176 The organization keenly mentioned that arbitration, with
its convenient forum selection and plaintiff-friendly fee-shifting
clauses, makes arbitration more utilitarian.177 For the Chamber, class
which were paid out to two consumer protection organizations. The attorneys, on the
other hand pocketed $2.6 million in fees. Id.
173
See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000019798 (last visited Dec.
2, 2016).
174
See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 124; Brief of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Business Roundtable,
American Bankers Association, and National Association of Manufacturers as Amici
Curiae or Petitioners at 1, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304,
(No. 12-133) (“[M]any of amici’s members use arbitration agreements in millions of
their contractual relationships. By eliminating the huge litigation costs associated
with resolving disputes in court, those agreements create cost savings that result in
lower prices for consumers, higher wages for employees, and benefits for the entire
national economy.”).
175
Letter from David Hirschmann, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, and Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, to Ms. Monica Jackson, Executive Secretary,
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau at 44 (Dec. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Chamber
Letter], http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB__arbitration_cover_letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) (“Moreover, claimants can
effectively vindicate in individual arbitration any claims that might be asserted
through class actions.”).
176
Id. at 3.
177
Id. at 14.
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actions with small-value claims do not need to be preserved because
they yield a small benefit to individuals, and merely act as a source of
enrichment for lawyers with their hefty fee awards.178
The Chamber highlighted that arbitration acts as a superior
alternative to the resource-depleted judiciary.179 In a world where
courts are shuttering their doors and cannot operate under a crushing
backlog of case dockets, arbitration acts as the only rapid-response
solution to citizens’ need for redress.180 In a world where class actions
lead to meager damages awards for plaintiffs, pro-consumer
arbitration provisions can provide superior recovery amounts per
plaintiff over litigation.181 In a world where the chance of a plaintiff
winning in litigation can be reduced to a fifty-fifty coin toss,
arbitration has not only been disproven as an inferior venue for
consumers and employees, but has been shown by certain studies to
serve as an equally effective and occasionally superior venue for the
same groups.182
For employment-related arbitrations, the Chamber found that
ADR served as a blessing rather than a curse. The letter cited to a 2004
study revealing employees were “almost 20% more likely to win in
arbitration than in litigated employment cases.”183 Further, the study
touted,
[L]ow-income employees brought 43.5% of arbitration claims,
most of which were low-value enough that the employees
would not have been able to find an attorney willing to bring
litigation on their behalf. These employees were often able to
pursue their arbitrations without an attorney, and they won

178

Id. at 47 (“In short, class actions do not provide class members with
anything close to the benefits claimed by their proponents, although they can . . .
enrich attorneys—both on the plaintiffs’ and defense side.”).
179
Id. at 3.
180
See id. at 4.
181
See id. at 18.
182
Id. at 17–22.
183
Id. at 22.
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their arbitrations at the same rate as individuals with
representation.184
Finally, the Chamber deduced that arbitrations between employers and
high-income employees proved as winnable for the employee as
litigation.185
The Chamber opposed federal regulations addressing individual
arbitration provisions promulgated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.186 In eschewing a uniform federal standard that
rendered such clauses invalid in contracts between individuals and
financial institutions, the organization argued that states were free to
declare certain types of arbitration clauses as violating state
unconscionability standards; indeed, courts have interpreted state
unconscionability laws as holding such arbitration agreements invalid
when the plaintiff was capped.187 However, federal schemes regulating
arbitration agreements overstepped the boundaries of federal authority,
and created friction between the CFPB’s power and the FAA.188 And
while the CFPB’s regulation has yet to suffer any litigation
challenging its validity, it might not live long enough to see that day
under President Trump.
I take issue with the Chamber’s assertions; to begin, the notion
that the commercial sector is resolving disputes in a fashion that
greatly benefits individuals over traditional litigation is disingenuous.
While certain plaintiffs may fair better under arbitration than they
would under a class action, not every plaintiff chooses to pursue
arbitration in the first place, nor does every plaintiff perform as well as
the sample of plaintiffs the Chamber chose to measure.189 If each
184

Id. at 21.
Id.
186
See generally id.
187
See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 Fed. App’x. 489, 492 (9th
Cir. 2009); Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2010).
188
Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32829 (proposed May 3, 2016).
189
See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132; AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (““What rational
lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the
possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?’”).
185
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claimant in a purported class received more in arbitration than they
would in litigation, and if arbitration is as accessible a procedure as a
class action, then surely it would be against the business’s best interest
to facilitate such proceedings, and the business would forego
arbitration in favor of traditional litigation. For a business to do
otherwise would be for it to inflict economic harm on itself.
To provide a more concrete example, assume every person in a
one-thousand-member putative class proceeded to arbitrate against a
commercial entity rather than litigate as a class; assume also that each
person held a valid claim that, when litigated or arbitrated, would
result in damages for them. If the business was forced to arbitrate, it
would have to allot a larger allowance for litigation contingencies in
its retained earnings. First, because each of those claims resulted in an
award for the plaintiff, the business is paying out the same damages in
arbitration than it is in litigation. Beyond that, one-thousand
arbitrations would, from an administrative standpoint, cost more
money and eat up more time (assuming a favorable clause that shifts
ADR costs on the business) than a class action, and business would
suffer more magnified losses than if it had opted for litigation.
Realistically, arbitration benefits the corporation just as much as it
does plaintiffs who collect more under it. As mentioned above,
because arbitration requires a plaintiff’s active participation in the
proceeding, and because class proceedings—which inherently feature
a large mass of passive plaintiffs—are often prevented in arbitration
provisions, the business expects fewer plaintiffs to devote their
resources toward pursuing a claim.190 The passive class member does
not exist in arbitration, which allows business to enjoy reduced total
costs of dispute resolution because fewer people pursue their claim.191
Further, as I briefly noted previously, arbitration also reduces the
threat of another liability for businesses: large punitive damages
awards. Historically, class awards that culminate in significant sums of
ordinary damages also featured large punitive damages. Courts award
these exemplary damages as a means of deterring an actor’s unwanted
behavior from habitual repetition. Because the Supreme Court has
190
191

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See id.
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jurisprudentially limited their magnitude to single digit multipliers of
ordinary damages, they achieve their deterrent purposes optimally
when attached to large ordinary damages awards.192 But because many
commercial entities have foreclosed the class proceeding as a viable
means, punitive damages will have to be levied in individual
arbitrations.193 In advancing the arbitral regime of dispute resolution,
commercial entities have almost completely shielded themselves from
any significant financial exposure to exemplary damages.194
Why is this bad? For one, it allows a business to supply products,
services, and employment with certain societal deficiencies. An
example might help illustrate this point. Let us consider a shareholder
who decides to invest in a company that just became listed on a public
exchange. The Securities Act of 1933 mandates that before a
corporation goes public—absent any exemption—it must file a
registration statement that includes a prospectus warning investors of
risks associated with an investment in that company.195 If a
shareholder acquires stock that requires individual arbitration under its
stock legend, and somebody later discovers the representations made
in the prospectus were deficient, that shareholder and all other
shareholders purchasing that stock in an the company’s initial public
offering would have a cause of action against the corporation.196 But
because the stock legend expressly called for individual arbitration of
claims, the shareholders would have to proceed alone in their dispute
with the company.
192

Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents, supra note 140.
193
The Chamber does acknowledge that this occurs. See Chamber Letter, supra
note 175 at 18. (“Claimants are able to win not only compensatory damages but also
‘other types of damages, including attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and interest.’
In particular, 63.1% of prevailing claimants who sought attorneys’ fees were
awarded them.”).
194
Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 190 (“As I noted at the outset, in many cases,
these waivers are tantamount to insulating businesses altogether from liability for the
small-stakes injuries they cause. Why wouldn’t every business want such
insulation?”).
195
15 U.S.C.A. § 77(g) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-244).
196
15 U.S.C.A. § 77(k) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-244).
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Let us further assume the shareholder wins his suit, or settles with
the corporation. Not only do many arbitration provisions mandate, predispute, that shareholder to sign a confidentiality agreement with any
potential outcome, but the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not
apply to the commercial entity in arbitration.197 This could paralyze
potential claimants from discussing the results of the arbitration with
one another or the public, which can harm current investors in the
company who unwittingly remain invested despite undisclosed risks,
and which makes markets less efficient. The absence of preclusion
also would allow the corporation to avoid pre-established liability
from any previous arbitration, which gives the opportunity for the
corporation to both win and lose claims stemming from similar or
identical fact patterns. This hypothesis strengthens when considering
the Note’s previous discussions about arbitrator’s biases that favor
“repeat players.” That is to say, if an arbitrator rules against the
corporation, nothing prevents the business from simply using another
arbitrator—perhaps a more favorably-ruling one—in the future.198
I do not mean to completely discredit the arguments advanced by
proponents of individual arbitrations. Some of them are compelling, so
much so that the Supreme Court has agreed with their propositions.
The decision between affirming individual arbitration clauses and
striking them is difficult, and it seems that the considerations, while
veiled in policy, tend to boil down into normative results. With a class
action, putative claimants who survive class certification will likely
recover something, though that amount could be paltry in comparison
197

Ann Conley, Promoting Finality: Using Offensive, Nonmutual Collateral
Estoppel in Employment Arbitration, 5 UC Irvine L. Rev. 651, 652 (2015),
http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol5/no3/Conley.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016)
(“There is no settled law in this area to answer these questions for employers,
employees, or arbitrators. The central question of this Note is whether employees
can use offensive, nonmutual collateral estoppel in employment arbitration.”).
198
See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 132 (“But in interviews with
The Times, more than three dozen arbitrators described how they felt beholden to
companies. Beneath every decision, the arbitrators said, was the threat of losing
business.”). This implies that arbitrator would be more inclined to decide a case in
favor of a “repeat player” that could provide consistent business. See Bingham,
supra note 164 at 223
126
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to the harm done by the actor199; with individual arbitration, many
claimants will either not pursue the claim, or, when faced with an
onerous arbitration provision, not recover at all.200 The decision likens
to a “pick your poison” scenario. For these reasons, courts have spilt a
great deal of ink and have split on whether individual arbitration
provisions should be upheld or stricken.201 The decision confounds
judges both state and federal, from the trial-level and appellate rungs
to our nation’s highest court. It is not easy.
And as things stand now, supporters of arbitration provisions have
proven highly competent in advancing their arguments in cases
involving contractual arbitration provisions and class waivers.202 The
Chamber, for example, has already filed a brief with the Supreme
Court that supports Epic’s petition.203 Given Epic’s appeal and prayer
for reversal, and for the reasons noted in Part III, infra, I join the
Chamber’s zealousness in having this nation’s highest court review
Lewis. However, where the Chamber seeks reversal, I seek
affirmation.
III. JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD UPHOLD THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EPIC DECISION
Predictably, when the Seventh Circuit handed down Lewis—and
especially after the Ninth Circuit joined its position by invalidating
employment contracts’ arbitration clauses in Morris v. Ernst & Young,
199

Chamber Letter, supra note 124 at 21. See also AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 37 (“Corporations said that class
actions were not needed because arbitration enabled individuals to resolve their
grievances easily. But court and arbitration records show the opposite has happened:
once blocked from going to court as a group, most people dropped their claims
entirely.”).
201
See supra Parts II.B–II.F.
202
The success these lobbying groups have had in the Supreme Court
demonstrates this the best. See supra Parts II.B–II.F
203
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Epic Systems v. Lewis, (Nos. 16-285 & 16300), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16-285-16-300-certamicus-chamber.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
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LLP—the Supreme Court swiveled its attention back to class actions
and arbitration provisions after leaving the topic dormant for more
than three years, and granted certiorari in mid-January. For them,
Lewis checks all the boxes that makes a case ripe for the Court’s
consideration: it features a disagreement between federal appellate
courts on how the law should be settled when individual arbitration
clauses fly in the face of the NLRA. Additionally, the case concerns a
legal topic whose subject matter causes the Court itself to split five-tofour. Finally, the Lewis holding would impact wide swaths of the
populace in an important and intimate part of their lives: employment.
The case for granting certiorari was strong. And while the Court has
yet to hear Lewis’s oral arguments, it has strong motivations to hold
off on this task until the Senate confirms Judge Gorsuch and he warms
a freshly hewn Court seat.
The current justices recognize their previous cases have put them
at loggerheads with one another, and an evenly-split, eight-justice
Court would simply affirm the Seventh Circuit’s holding with nonbinding effect on the other federal circuits.204 Thus, their current
abstention from hearing oral arguments until the October 2017 term is
unsurprising. Nevertheless, once the Court returns to its nine-justice
normality, it should affirm the Seventh Circuit’s holding that
invalidates Epic’s arbitration clause.
Why affirm Lewis? First, the Supreme Court’s decision in such a
case—irrespective of whether the Court affirms or reverses the
Seventh Circuit—would answer an otherwise ignored question: does
the FAA supersede statutes that permit collective actions, do such
statutes trump the FAA, or must courts reconcile the two statutory
schemes? The Court’s definitive holding (unless it only garners a
plurality opinion) would provide lower federal courts a means of
analogizing to Lewis when assessing other statutes similar to the
NLRA. Thus, if a securities statute permits collective action against a
corporation, lower federal courts would be able to graft the Court’s
interpretation in Lewis to such a statute and conclude whether a case’s
plaintiffs are entitled to a class action, or whether each claimant must
204

See United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016); Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Association, 135 S.Ct. 1083 (Mem) (2016).
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proceed on an individual basis. Presumably, the same would occur in
statutes addressing consumers’ rights. In taking up Lewis for
argument, the Supreme Court would color in another section of the
fragmented jurisprudence surrounding class actions and the FAA.
More importantly, the Court should uphold the Seventh Circuit
because to not do so would result in seismic shifts in the legal
landscape of employment law. A reversal of Lewis’s holding would
effectively relegate any employment dispute—whether for something
as purely financial as unpaid wages to something as personal as race
and gender discrimination suits—to individual arbitration. Nothing
would stop employers from enforcing individual arbitration clauses
into all its employees’ contracts.
Ostensibly, one could argue that not all businesses would
necessarily blunt their employees’ rights to collective action through
such contractual provisions. Yet, assuming the Court does reverse
Judge Wood’s opinion, what would cause businesses to not
incorporate individual arbitration clauses in all their employment
contracts?205 The agreements curb damages awards (both
compensatory and punitive) businesses pay out to claimants through
individual arbitration, and reduce potential allowance accounts in a
company’s retained earnings statement (or balance sheet). They save
the corporation money relative to traditional court filings. They
prevent communication amongst claimants in arbitration through nondisclosure provisions. What does a business have to lose?
Even if one takes the Chamber of Commerce’s point in Part II,
infra, at face value—that is, that individuals recover more from an
employer in individual arbitration than in class litigation—virtually
nothing deters a commercial entity from engaging in the unwanted
behavior for which it was sued in the first place. As noted above,
while a business’s employees may have their individual harms
redressed, the workforce as a whole might not, and the business is free
to continue its socially harmful behavior without any retributive threat
205

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 190 (“In my view, this question—whether
businesses will take advantage of the opportunity to slip arbitration clauses with
class action waivers into all their contracts—is largely a rhetorical one. Why
wouldn’t businesses take advantage of this opportunity?”).
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from its workforce. That means that unpaid wages could continue to
go unpaid for those unaware that they were deprived of their earnings,
and women and minority workers would experience no improvement
in promotional opportunities. At its worst, arbitration clauses could
allow businesses to operate with a non-diverse workforce without any
internal pressures to change.206
In the end, the issue remains whether Judge Gorsuch would vote
alongside Judge Wood and reconcile the FAA with the NLRA, or
whether this justice would determine that the former supersedes the
latter and preserves individual arbitrations.207 While the choice for a
conservative justice seems clear-cut from a political ideology, the
issue blurs when one assesses the issue from a statutorily interpretive
lexicon. Few would argue that the Seventh Circuit’s decision to
invalidate Epic’s arbitration provision in its contracts qualifies as a
politically liberal decision; the result strips away a pro-business
safeguard and exposes Epic to increased risk.
However, Judge Wood had to assess Lewis within the Supreme
Court’s established analyses in Concepcion and Italian Colors.208 In
doing so, she argued that conservative doctrines of statutory
interpretation require that “when two statutes are capable of coexistence . . . it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective”
and that “‘[w]hen two statutes complement each other’—that is, ‘each
has its own scope and purpose’ and imposes ‘different requirements
and protections’—finding that one precludes the other would flout the
congressional design.”209 Wood posited that because the NLRA
invalidates Epic’s contractual provision (by preventing enforcement of
contract provisions that abrogate collective actions), such an
invalidation qualifies as the clause being illegal “upon grounds in law
206

This is true unless the employees resort to a walk-out or the market reacts
negatively to such provisions, an unlikely event because many people don’t know
the contracts they sign contain arbitration provisions.
207
See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (7th Cir. 2016);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
208
Lewis, 812 F.3d at 1158–59.
209
Id. at 1157, 1159.
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or in equity” under the FAA.210 Concluding, Wood observed that the
two statutes can symbiotically work with one another, and one did not
oust the other.211
Judge Gorsuch will face an interpretive fork: he could either
assume the Seventh Circuit’s reconciliation of the FAA and the
NLRA—which, assuming the nominee carries a textualist pedigree,
would likely comport with her jurisprudential philosophy on
constitutional and statutory interpretation—or he could perpetuate
Justice Scalia’s trailblazing interpretation of the FAA that preserves
arbitration in the vast majority of contexts. A fiscally neoliberalist
platform adopted by many Republicans in Congress would call for a
nominee who would carry Italian Colors’ holding into the
employment setting.212 But that policy point seems to go against
conservative forms of statutory interpretation.213 Thus, the Court’s
ruling on Lewis remains enshrouded in uncertainty. The Court would
splinter, likely five-to-four or six-to-three, but which way the majority
falls can only be answered with time.
If the Court reverses Lewis, such a sudden upheaval in the way
employment actions are brought could trigger remedial legislation
from Congress that would undo the Court’s holding. Despite
Republicans’ traditional, pro-business platform, the 2016 election
210

Id.
See id. at 1159–60.
212
Neoliberalism, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/neoliberalism.asp?lgl=no-infinite (last visited
Dec. 2, 2016). See George Monbiot, Neoliberalism – the Ideology at the Root of All
Our Problems, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problemgeorge-monbiot (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). As suggested by The Guardian’s article,
in this case, the United States has a legislative scheme in place that transfers some of
peoples’ access to courts through a mutually-agreed-to contract. If efficiency can be
achieved in arbitration over litigation, then a neoliberal economist would argue for a
political and judicial climate that favors arbitration.
213
See William Eskirdge et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation and
Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 639 (5th ed. 2014); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within
Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 702, 704–714 (2014).
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injected the GOP with a strong populist ire that allowed Donald
Trump to . . . well . . . trump his Republican colleagues in the
primaries and Hilary Clinton in the general election.214 Republican
lawmakers, along with blue-collar Democrat legislators, might
propose legislation that preserves the class action explicitly under the
NLRA and statutes like it in the securities and consumer settings.
Though, admittedly, similar legislation has been previously proposed
under Republican-controlled Congresses, and has not received so
much as a discussion in committee.215 Yet, one other avenue exists for
remedial reform: administrative regulation.
Alluded to previously, the CFPB has drafted a regulation that
proscribes financial institutions from including arbitration provisions
in their consumer contracts that foreclose parties from filing a class
action against the financial institution.216 While such a regulation is on
President Trump’s chopping block along with the rest of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, its regulation
of consumers’ financial contracts demonstrates a structure that other
agencies can use to regulate arbitration provisions in their own
spheres. Thus, the NLRB, for example, could draw up a regulation to
the tune of the CFPB’s, one which prevents employers from drafting
arbitration agreements that preclude any class action filings for
employment discrimination cases. The same can be said of the
214

See generally Michael Kazin, Trump and American Populism: Old Whine,
New Bottles, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-06/trump-andamerican-populism (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Trump’s
Populism is Not Just a Western Phenomenon, NEW YORKER (Nov. 16, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin-wallace-wells/trumps-populism-is-notjust-a-western-phenomenon (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Michael Lind, Donald
Trump, the Perfect Populist, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfect-populist213697 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).
215
H.R. 2087: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, GovTrack,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2087 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); S.
2506: Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2016, GovTrack,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2506 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). As the
website notes, both bills have a one percent chance of being enacted.
216
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Securities and Exchange Commission, which could enact a similar
regulatory regime in the context of stock certificates or other securityrelated contracts.
Just as with the CFPB’s proposed rule, one must question the
likelihood of such regulations taking place over the next four years.217
And just like other regulations, those that abrogate arbitration
provisions would likely be the subject of litigation, and judges would
be reluctant to stray away from deferring to agencies’ expertise in
accordance with the Chevron doctrine218 (even with Judge Gorsuch’s
questionable jurisprudence on this deference).219 Challenges aside, the
administrative arm of the federal government remains an open avenue
to reform arbitration clauses.
CONCLUSION
Few recognize how much the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Federal Arbitration Act affects the populace’s access to
courts.220 As contractual provisions erode the class action
mechanism’s prevalence, there arises a need for judges, legislators,
and regulators to step in and support individuals’ abilities to
collectively litigate. Just as it has in other hot-button issues, Justice
Scalia’s death—alongside the Senate’s effective obstruction of Judge
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Garland and President Trump’s nomination of Neil Gorsuch221—has
caused scholars to question whether the Court’s newest member will
take up the conservative mantle of his predecessor, or instead
adjudicate with a more moderate jurisprudence. To that end, Lewis
offers the Court an opportunity to either shift its scorched-earth stance
on arbitration toward a balanced relationship between private dispute
resolution and class litigation, or maintain the status quo and let class
actions slip off into procedural extinction. Ultimately, the judiciary,
and indeed the public must ask itself: do we ever want to see a case
like Ms. Rajender’s again? As is frequently the answer to such a
question, only time will tell. Nevertheless, while the Court may
struggle with this case, this student has made up his mind: Lewis
merits affirmation, if not for the mere fact that a reversal would bring
the country one step closer to the death knell of the class action.
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